How RubyGems Protects Us From Supply Chain Attacks (And Why Every Ruby Developer Should Care)
I recently read a report from the RubyGems.org security team about how they detected and neutralized another batch of malicious gems. And you know what? We developers often take the security of our ecosystem for granted — until something breaks in our CI pipeline.
What Really Happens Behind the Scenes
Every time you run gem install
or bundle
, there's an entire security system working on the RubyGems side:
- Automated scanning of every uploaded package: static and dynamic content analysis.
- Risk assessment and escalation: suspicious cases are flagged for manual review by maintainers.
- Retroactive scanning: re-checking old packages as detection signatures and methods improve.
Key statistic from the reports
The team estimates that 70–80% of malicious packages are detected before public reports about them — meaning we don't even notice most threats in production.
The Detection Pipeline: SAST/DAST, Risk Scoring & Retroactive Scanning
Simplified, the pipeline looks like this: upload → static analysis (looking for suspicious patterns) → "sandbox" for dynamic analysis → risk scoring based on metrics → manual review when alerts trigger → notifications and package removal → retroactive scan of the entire old pool when new rules appear.
What they look for first
- Credential theft, attempts to exfiltrate data.
- Running arbitrary code during installation (
extconf.rb
, hooks). - Impersonating popular names (typosquatting) and suspicious new releases.
- Obfuscation, unusual network domains/dependencies, self-signed downloads.
July Case Study: How Incident Response Works
Here's how a recent incident unfolded:
- July 20th — RubyGems systems flagged a batch of gems stealing social media credentials.
- By July 28th — nearly all packages were removed and distribution stopped.
- August 7th — researchers published an analysis and added 16 more artifacts — the community collaboratively closed the remaining gaps.
What's important about this case
The RubyGems team identified the threat earlier than public reports. Internal registry signals and automation aren't just "checkboxes" — they're real shields for the ecosystem.
The Reality That Should Concern All of Us
A critical part of this work relies on a small number of people and sponsors. Volunteers and maintainers literally remove an average of one malicious package every week. This is constant background attacks, not rare incidents.
Why This Matters for Every Developer
- Threats are real: one package per week represents a systematic attack on the supply chain.
- Security costs money: servers, tools, incident response — this isn't "free magic."
- We're all in this together: any Ruby project pulls in dependencies.
Practical Steps: What to Do Right Now
Minimize attack surface
- Lock versions and platforms in
Gemfile.lock
. - Avoid
git
dependencies without commit SHA. - Use "narrow" version ranges (
~>
) for critical gems. - Remove unused dependencies.
Team processes
- Code review for adding/updating gems.
- Mandatory
CHANGELOG
and "why this gem?" in PRs. - Enable Dependabot/GitHub Alerts.
- Quarterly "dependency hygiene day."
Tools to install
1# 1) Audit dependency vulnerabilities
2gem install bundler-audit
3bundle audit check --update
4
5# 2) Check licenses (optional)
6gem install license_finder
7license_finder
8
9# 3) OSV / Snyk / Trivy as additional layer (optional)
10# osv-scanner, snyk, aquasecurity/trivy
Recommended Bundler settings
1# Prevent mixed sources (protection against substitution)
2bundle config set disable_multisource true
3
4# Cache locally and use HTTPS sources only
5bundle config set cache_all true
6bundle config set clean 'true'
About gem signatures
Signed releases can be enhanced with trust policies during installation, but this is still rare in the ecosystem. Don't rely on signatures as your only barrier — maintain defense in depth.
CI/CD Examples: Automating Security Checks
1name: Security checks
2
3on:
4 pull_request:
5 paths:
6 - 'Gemfile'
7 - 'Gemfile.lock'
8 schedule:
9 - cron: '0 6 * * 1' # weekly on Mondays
10
11jobs:
12 bundler-audit:
13 runs-on: ubuntu-latest
14 steps:
15 - uses: actions/checkout@v4
16 - uses: ruby/setup-ruby@v1
17 with:
18 ruby-version: '3.3'
19 bundler-cache: true
20 - name: Install bundler-audit
21 run: gem install bundler-audit
22 - name: Audit
23 run: bundle audit check --update
24
25 osv-scanner:
26 runs-on: ubuntu-latest
27 steps:
28 - uses: actions/checkout@v4
29 - name: Run OSV scanner
30 uses: google/osv-scanner-action@v1
31 with:
32 scan-args: '-L -r .'
Quick PR checklist
- New gem? Justify the value and mention alternatives.
- Is there active support/releases/downloads?
- Is supply chain risk covered: version pinning, source, commit pin for git?
- Did the PR pass
bundle audit
and license checks?
About Money and Sustainability: Supporting Infrastructure
This isn't charity — it's business insurance. If your company makes money from Ruby products, it makes sense to support the RubyGems supporter program and security efforts.
Discuss a small sponsorship budget with your team. In return, you get ecosystem stability that your product is built on.
Key Takeaways
The July malicious gems incident showed that the RubyGems system works — and often gets ahead of public research. But taking it for granted is dangerous. Behind every successful gem install
are people, processes, and expenses.
What I'm doing personally: being more careful about dependencies, enabling security alerts, automating audits in CI, and raising the topic of sponsorship with leadership. Maybe it's time to give back to the ecosystem.
Share your experience
If you have practices or case studies about handling supply chain incidents in Ruby — share them in the comments. The more transparent our processes, the stronger the shield for the entire ecosystem.